The status of perceptual priming and word-completion priming in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) was examined. Experiment 1 established the reliability of the perceptual priming measure in normal subjects. In Experiment 2, AD patients showed a normal magnitude of perceptual priming. In Experiment 3. a single group of AD patients showed a normal magnitude of perceptual priming and impaired word-completion priming. Further, word-completion priming, but not perceptual priming, was correlated with verbal fluency performance in AD. These results suggest a dissociation between two components of verbal priming. Perceptual priming may reflect the operation of a structural-perceptual memory system mediated by occipital lobe regions relatively spared in AD. Word-completion priming may reflect the operation of a lexicalsemantic memory system mediated by temporoparietal lobe regions compromised in AD.
The neural architecture of human memory is revealed by dissociations among memory capacities in patients with brain lesions. Some compelling dissociations come from the study of patients who are globally amnesic due to limbic-diencephalic lesions. Despite severe deficits in recall and recognition of recently encountered information, such patients can show normal repetition priming effects (Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, & Wolbarst, 1985; Graf, Squire, & Handler, 1984; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968 . In priming tasks, the measure of memory is the facilitatory or biasing effect that exposure to a stimulus has on subsequent processing of the same stimulus. The preservation of priming effects in amnesia suggests that priming does not depend on limbic-diencephalic structures supporting recall and recognition. However, these findings do not elucidate the nature of the neural circuits on which priming does depend. This issue has been addressed more recently in studies of patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD), whose neuropathology extends beyond limbic regions to include temporal, parietal, and frontal cortex (Brun & Englund, 1981; Pearson, Esiri, Hiorns, Wilcock, & Powell, 1985; Terry, Peck, DcTcresa, Schecter, & Horoupian, 1981; Wilcock & Esiri, 1982) . Several investigators have reported that priming on a word-completion task is impaired in early stage AD patients (Gabrieli, 1986; Heindel, Salmon, Shults. Walicke, & Butters, 1989; Salmon, Shimamura, Butters, & Smith, 1988 ; Shimamura, Salmon, Squire, & Butters, 1987) . In contrast, Gabrieli et al. (1990) found a near-normal magnitude of priming in AD patients on an incomplete-picture identification task. Word-completion and incomplete-picture identification tasks elicit normal (or near-normal) priming in amnesic patients Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968 ; their dissociability in AD patients suggests that each task invokes distinct cognitive processes mediated by separable neural circuits (not including limbic-diencephalic circuits). Priming in word completion may depend on a neural circuit that is compromised in AD; priming in incomplete-picture identification may depend on a neural circuit that is relatively spared in AD.
The goal of the present experiments was to clarify the conditions under which AD patients show a normal magnitude of priming and to test a hypothesis about the basis of such priming. Gabrieli and colleagues (Gabrieli, 1989, in press; Gabrieli et al., 1990) proposed that the status of priming in AD on a given task depends on the relative contributions of perceptual and conceptual learning processes to the priming effect: Tasks in which priming is largely the product of enhanced perceptual processes (e.g., incompletepicture identification) will elicit normal priming in AD. Tasks in which priming is largely the product of enhanced conceptual processes (e.g., word completion) will fail to elicit normal priming in AD. Further, Gabrieli and colleagues proposed 326 that perceptual priming effects reflect the operation of a structural-perceptual memory system localized to occipital lobe regions relatively spared in AD and that conceptual priming effects reflect the operation of a lexical-semantic memory system localized to temporoparietal regions compromised in AD. 1 However, word-completion and incomplete-picture identification tasks differ not only in terms of their conceptual or perceptual demands but also in terms of their potential dependence on the integrity of language processes. Because AD patients have a range of language deficits (Appell, Kertesz, & Fisman, 1982; Cummings, Benson, Hill, & Read, 1985; Huff, Corkin, & Growdon, 1986) , one could postulate that impaired priming in word completion and intact priming in incomplete-picture identification is due to the fact that the stimuli are lexical in the former instance and pictorial in the latter. By this account, the status of priming in AD is tied to the nature of task stimuli, rather than to the perceptual or conceptual nature of the processes operating on those stimuli.
In the present study, we examined the performance of AD patients on a priming task that required perceptual identification of briefly presented words. As in the word-completion task, the stimuli in the present task were lexical. Like the incomplete-picture identification task, this task posed a perceptual challenge. If the performance dissociation in AD is due to the lexical or pictorial nature of the priming stimuli, then priming in perceptual identification of words should be impaired in AD. If the dissociation is due to the relative perceptual or conceptual demands of the task (as we postulated), then priming in this task should be normal in AD. In a further experiment, we administered the perceptual priming task and a word-completion priming task to a single group of AD patients to demonstrate a within-subjects dissociation between a perceptual and a conceptual priming task.
A large body of experimental literature examines priming in perceptual identification of briefly presented words in normal subjects (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a Jacoby, , 1983b Jacoby & Dallas, 198 l:Murrell& Morton, 1974; Postman & Solomon, 1949 -1950 Winnick & Daniel, 1970; Winnick & Nachbar, 1967) . The results of those studies show that perceptual priming effects are often small and that the presence and size of such effects is influenced by a number of parameters, including word frequency, word length, and the number and spacing of stimulus presentations. Because the subject population in our patient study would be relatively small, it was important to demonstrate that our measure provided a reliable index of perceptual priming. To that end, in Experiments 1A and 1B, we administered the priming task to a large group of normal subjects. These experiments provided secondarily the opportunity to demonstrate that the priming effect elicited in the present task showed the same sensitivity to perceptual manipulations and the same relation to recognition memory as other perceptual priming tasks described in the literature.
EXPERIMENT 1
A number of studies have shown that prior exposure to a word facilitates perceptual identification of that word on brief presentation. The size of this priming effect is enhanced after multiple prior exposures and is greater for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) . Further, the priming effect is reduced or eliminated if the perceptual modality of presentation differs in the study and identification phases (Clarke & Morton, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Kirsner, Milech, & Standen, 1983; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) . In Experiment 1A, we examined the effects of stimulus repetition and word frequency on perceptual priming and recognition memory. In Experiment IB, we examined the effect of a shift in presentation modality from study to test on the same priming and recognition measures.
Experiment 1A

Method Subjects
The subjects were 32 college students (15 men and 17 women) who were paid for their participation in the experiment.
Materials
We selected 280 four-and five-letter words, of which half were high frequency (with at least 85 occurrences per million, M = 237) and half were low frequency (with no more than 10 occurrences per million, M= 3.6), according to the Kucera and Francis (1967) word frequency count. Twenty-four of these words were used as filler items. The remaining 256 words were divided into four lists, which were used to create four distinct, balanced forms of the test. Each 64-word list included: 16 high-frequency four-letter words; 16 lowfrequency four-letter words; 16 high-frequency five-letter words; and 16 low-frequency five-letter words. The mean frequency of high-and low-frequency words for each of the four lists was similar. In each of the test forms, half of the 64 words were presented in an initial study list and in the subsequent perceptual identification or recognition task (targets), and the other half appeared only in the perceptual identification or recognition task (foils). Of the words that appeared in the study list, half were presented once, and the other half were presented three times. The target and foil word sets each included equal numbers of four-and five-letter and high-and lowfrequency words, as did the word sets presented once or three times in the study list. Complete counterbalancing of words across conditions yielded 16 test forms: Stimulus Sets (4) x Study Conditions (2; presented vs. unpresented) x Exposure Conditions (2; one vs. three exposures).
1 In the present study, all references to priming refer specifically to repetition priming effects. We wish to distinguish repetition priming from semantic priming, which is manifested in a reduced time to process a word immediately preceded by a semantically related word rather than an unrelated word. Unlike the repetition priming effects that form the topic of the present study, semantic priming effects are short lasting (i.e., not lasting beyond one or two items) in normal subjects (Dannenbring & Briand, 1982; Gough, Alford, & Holley-Wilcox, 1981) . Further, there is evidence that repetition and semantic priming effects are additive and thereby reflect the operation of separate processes (Den Heyer, Goring, & Dannenbring, 1985; Wilding, 1986) . Our present findings neither contradict nor support studies indicating that semantic priming effects may be normal in AD (Nebes, Boiler, & Holland, 1986; Nebes, Brady, & Huff, 1989; Nebes, Martin, & Horn, 1984) . 
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Procedure
In brief, each subject studied one list of words, performed a perceptual-identification task with studied and unstudied words, then studied a second, different list of words, and performed a yes-no recognition task with studied and unstudied words. All stimuli were presented on the screen of an IBM personal computer. Subjects sat approximately 20 in. (50.8 cm) from the screen.
Study task. The procedure in the study phase was identical for the perceptual-identification and recognition tasks. Subjects were told that they would see a series of words presented one at a time on the computer screen and that they were to read each word aloud. Thirty-two different words were presented singly on the computer screen; half were presented one time, and the other half were presented three times (once within each third of the list). In addition to these 64 trials, three filler words were presented at the beginning and end of the list (to blunt any primacy and recency effects on later memory for the stimuli), yielding a total of 70 trials. At the initiation of the expenmenter, each words was presented on the computer screen for 4 s. The study phase was followed immediately by a perceptual-identification or recognition task.
Perceptual identification. Subjects were told that they would perform a second task that was unrelated to the study task. They were told that a series of words would be presented very briefly on the computer screen and that they were to identify each word. Each trial was preceded by the appearance of a fixation character (+) in the middle of the screen. Subjects were instructed to fixate this character in preparation for the brief appearance of a word. On each trial, a word was flashed on the computer screen and then replaced by a backward mask (#####) of 250-ms duration. The initial presentation time was 16.7 ms. If the subject was unable to identify the word at this exposure time, then it was presented in the next trial for 33.4 ms. The same word was presented in additional increments of 16.7 ms on successive trials until the subject correctly identified it. The computer recorded the number of presentations (i.e., the exposure time) required to identify each word. Sixty-four different words were presented in the perceptual-identification task. Thirty-two of these words had appeared in the prior study list: 16 had appeared once, and 16 had appeared three times. The other 32 words had not appeared in the prior study list.
Recognition. In the recognition test, subjects were told that a series of words would be presented on the computer screen, some of which had appeared in the preceding study list. Subjects were asked to respond "yes" if they had seen the word on the prior list and "no" if they had not. Sixty-four words were presented in the recognition test; half had appeared in the prior study list (once or three times), and the other half were new.
Each subject performed a perceptual-identification task with one test form and a recognition test with a different test form composed of entirely different stimuli. The administration of the 16 test forms in the perceptual-identification and recognition tasks was counterbalanced across the 32 subjects.
Results
Perceptual Identification
The dependent measure was the exposure time required for the correct identification of words. The experimental manipulations of interest were prior study condition (studied vs. unstudied), repetition (one vs. three occurrences in the study list), and word frequency (high vs. low). The first two manipulations were combined to yield a single design factor of prior exposure (none, one, or three) in which foils had no prior exposures. For each subject, the mean exposure time (in milliseconds) required to identify words was calculated for each of the six conditions denned by the combination of the prior exposure and word-frequency factors (Figure 1 ). The magnitude of priming on this task was small, but the effect was robust: Every one of the 32 subjects showed a mean priming effect in the predicted direction.
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANO-VA) with factors of word frequency (high vs. low) and prior exposure (none, one or three) revealed a significant effect for prior exposure, F(2, 62) = 36.49, p < .001. Planned comparisons indicated lhat this effect was due to a difference between studied and unstudied words, F(l, 62) = 70.26, p < .001; the difference between items in the one-exposure and three-exposure conditions was only marginally significant, F(l, 62) = 3.03, p < .10. High-frequency words were identified at a briefer exposure time than low-frequency words, F(l, 31) = 4.07, p = .052. The magnitude of the priming effect, however, was greater for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words (5.68 ms and 2.63 ms, respectively). This difference was reflected in an interaction between prior exposure and word frequency, F(2, 62) = 6.24, p < .005.
Recognition
Because the study lists preceding the yes-no recognition test were identical to those preceding the perceptual-identification task, the analysis of the effects of prior exposure and word frequency on recognition memory paralleled the analysis of the perceptual-identification dala. For each subject, we calculated the proportion of words correctly recognized from the study list (hits) in each of the four conditions defined by crossing repctilion (one vs. three exposures) with word frequency (high vs. low). We calculated the proportion of Word Frequency Figure 2 . Visual recognition performance in college students (n = 32) for high-frequency and low-frequency words that were presented visually one or three times in a prior study list.
unstudied words incorrectly attributed to the study list (false alarms) in each of the two word frequency conditions. These proportions were used to determine a d' score for studied words in each of the four study conditions defined by repetition and word frequency (Figure 2) . A two-way ANOVA with factors of repetition and word frequency showed that recognition was more accurate for words with three prior exposures than those with one, F(l, 31) = 85.12,p< .001, and that recognition was more accurate for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words, F(\, 31) = 48.26, p < .001. There was no Repetition x Frequency interaction (p > .5).
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant effects for prior exposure, F(2, 62) = 6.42, p < .005, and word frequency, F(l, 31) = 13.37, p < .001, but no interaction between prior exposure and word frequency (p > .4), in contrast to an interaction between these factors in Experiment 1A.
We combined the results of Experiments 1A and IB and performed a three-way ANOVA, adding one bctween-subjects variable (visual-visual presentation in Experiment 1A vs. auditory-visual presentation in Experiment IB) to the two within-subjects variables previously examined (prior exposure and word frequency). This analysis revealed main effects for prior exposure, F(l, 124) = 35.18, p < .001, and word frequency, F(\, 62) = 16.74, p < .001, an interaction between prior exposure and word frequency, F(2, 124) = 5.97, p < .005, and a significant interaction between prior exposure and modality of study task, F(2, 124) = 5.20, p < .01. The interaction between prior exposure and modality indicates that there was less priming in Experiment IB, in which the modality of presentation was different in the study and perceptual-identification tasks. None of the other main effects or interactions reached significance.
We calculated the mean d' values for studied words in each of the four study conditions denned by repetition and word frequency (Figure 4) .
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA crossing repetition and word frequency revealed significant effects for repetition, f'(l, 31) = 49.89,,p < .001, and word frequency, F(l, 31) = 34.57, p < .001. There was no Repetition x Frequency interaction. A second analysis combined the results of Exper-
Experiment IB
Method Subjects
The subjects were 32 college students (12 men and 19 women) who were paid for their participation in the experiment. None of these subjects had participated in Experiment IA.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1A with one exception: In the study task, words were presented auditorily rather than visually. Subjects were asked to repeat each word after it was spoken by the experimenter. In the perceptualidentification or recognition task that followed the study task, words were presented visually as in Experiment 1A.
Results
Perceptual Identification
For each subject, we calculated the mean exposure time needed to identify high-and low-frequency words after no, one, or three exposures (Figure 3) . Word Frequency Figure 4 . Visual recognition performance in college students (n = 32) for high-and low-frequency words that were presented auditorily one or three times in a prior study list.
iments 1A and IB in a three-way ANOVA to examine the effect of a modality shift on recognition memory for the words. This analysis revealed main effects for repetition, F( 1, 62) = 130.48, p < .001, and word frequency, F(\, 62) = 78.97, p < .001. None of the interactions reached significance. Notably, there was no main effect for modality of the study task (p > .5); that is, visual recognition memory after auditory study of words (Experiment IB) was equivalent to that after visual study of words (Experiment 1 A).
Discussion of Experiments 1A and IB
In Experiments 1A and IB, perceptual identification of a briefly presented word was facilitated by prior exposure to that word, the magnitude of this priming effect was greater with low-frequency words than with high-frequency words (but only when the modality of presentation was the same in the study and identification tasks), and a change in modality between study and test reduced the priming effect but did not influence recognition memory. These results are consistent with those obtained in prior perceptual priming studies and confirmed the validity of the present paradigm. The robustness of the priming effect in Experiment 1A made us confident that this measure would be reliable in the smaller population of subjects who participated in Experiment 2.
In at least two prior studies, priming in perceptual identification of words was eliminated entirely under conditions in which the perceptual modality of stimuli differed in the study and identification tasks (Clarke & Morton, 1983, Experiment 2; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) . These results underscore the critical contribution of perceptual processes to the priming effect.
However, in Experiment 1B and in one other study (Kirsner et al., 1983) , perceptual priming was significantly present (although reduced) under cross-modal study-test conditions: Auditory exposure to words had a significant facilitatory effect on subsequent visual identification. Given that this facilitation occurred in the absence of overt perceptual overlap between stimuli at study and test, it raises the possibility that, in some instances, priming in perceptual identification of words may include a nonperceptual component. For example, modality-free lexical or semantic mechanisms might be responsible for residual cross-modal priming effects.
Alternatively, cross-modal perceptual priming effects might be the product of automatic visual processing that accompanies auditory exposure to a word (a possibility raised in the context of other priming tasks by Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Roediger & Dlaxton, 1987b; Schacter & Graf, 1989) . For example, upon hearing a word at study, a subject may spontaneously imagine the appearance of that word; that mental image may exert the same influence as a real percept on performance in the subsequent visual priming task. Support for this view comes from evidence that subjects instructed to image words presented auditorily at study can show priming effects equivalent to those shown by subjects who perceived words visually at study (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a; Schacter & Graf, 1989) . Although the priming tasks in these two studies were not the same as that in the present study, the findings suggest that cross-modal study-test conditions do not necessarily eliminate the contribution of perceptual mechanisms: The significant (albeit reduced) crossmodal perceptual priming effects demonstrated in Experiment IB (and in Kirsner el al., 1983 ) may reflect perceptual learning processes operating in the absence of a sensory stimulus.
Thus, there are two possible accounts of the cross-modal priming effect shown by subjects in Experiment IB: It could reflect the contribution of nonperceptual (e.g., lexical-semantic) learning mechanisms, or it could reflect the contribution of perceptual learning mechanisms operating in the absence of a visual stimulus. By the former account, priming in perceptual identification of words does not constitute a pure index of perceptual learning processes, but by the latter account it does.
The hypothesis we wish to test in the present study is that the perceptual learning processes that contribute to priming effects are preserved in AD patients. Our prediction that AD patients will show normal priming in perceptual identification of words is based on the assumption that this task provides an accurate index of those processes. By one account of cross-modal perceptual priming effects, however, the task may include nonperceptual components; we would not expect the contribution of those nonperceptual components to be expressed in the performance of AD patients on this task.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, we examined priming during perceptual identification of briefly presented words in AD patients. We hypothesized that priming in this task relics on perceptual learning processes of the sort that mediate priming on an incomplete-picture identification task and therefore will be normal in AD patients.
Method Subjects
We tested 12 patients with a diagnosis of probable AD and 12 age-matched healthy control subjects. AD patients. All AD patients had a diagnosis of probable AD based on National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke (N1NCDS) (McKhann et al., 1984) and National Institute on Aging (NLA) (Khachaturian, 1985) criteria. The group included 5 women and 7 men. The mean age was 69.8 years (range = 58-82), and the mean level of education was 14.3 years (range = 12-19). The mean Blessed Dementia Scale (BDS) score (Blessed, Tomlinson, & Roth, 1968) was 18.7 (range = 7-27.5), indicating mild to severe dementia. No patient was institutionalized.
Normal control subjects (NCS). The control group consisted of spouses or siblings of AD patients involved in research studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Clinical Research Center and subjects recruited through newspaper advertisements. The group included 9 women and 3 men with a mean age of 64.6 years (range = 52-75), a mean educational level of 14.1 years (range = 12-20) , and a mean BDS score of 0.5, indicating absence of dementia. (The BDS score was unavailable for 1 control subject; however, a neurological examination confirmed that she was not demented.) There was no significant difference between the mean ages or levels of education in the AD and NCS groups.
Materials
The stimuli and test forms used in this experiment were a subset of those described in Experiment 1 and formed a partially counterbalanced design. Specifically, 2 of the 16 test forms already described were used in the perceptual-identification task; the two forms included identical stimulus items and counterbalanced those items across the two study conditions (studied vs. unstudied). Thus, the items that appeared as targets on one form appeared as foils on the other. The administration of the two test forms was counterbalanced across subjects in each group. A single third form, composed of stimuli that did not overlap with the stimuli on the perceptualidentification task, was used in the recognition test for all subjects.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that described in Experiment 1 A, Subjects studied a list of words, performed a perceptual-identification task for studied and unstudied words, studied a second list of words, and then performed a yes-no recognition test with studied and unstudied words. The stimuli were presented in the manner described in Experiment 1A.
Results
Perceptual Identification
As in Experiment 1. the study condition factor (studied vs. unstudied) was combined with the repetition factor (one vs. three occurrences in the study list) to yield a single factor of prior exposure (none vs. one vs. three), in which unstudied items had no prior exposures. The prior exposure factor was crossed with word frequency (high vs. low) to yield six experimental conditions. For each subject, the mean exposure time required to identify words was calculated for each of these conditions (Figure 5 ), Ten of 12 subjects in the NCS group and 10 of 12 subjects in the AD group showed a mean priming effect in the predicted direction.
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA (with factors of subject group, prior exposure, and word frequency) showed that AD patients required significantly more exposure time than NCS to identify words, F(\, 22) = 4.61, p < .05, and that high-frequency words were identified at briefer exposure times than low frequency words, F(\, 22) = 4.57, p < .05. A main effect for prior exposure, F(2, 44) = 9.87, p < .001, indicated that subjects benefited from prior exposure to words in the study list when performing the perceptual-identification task. Critically, there was no Group x Prior Exposure interaction (p > .5), indicating that the priming effect did not differ in magnitude in the AD and NCS groups. The lack of interaction was supported by two further analyses. In the first, scores were collapsed across word frequency conditions and the two prior study repetition conditions (one vs. three exposures) to yield a single score for studied and unstudied items. A two-way ANOVA with factors of group and item type (studied vs. unstudied) revealed main effects for group, F(\, 22) = 4.45, p < .05, and item type, F(\, 22) = 11.51, p < .005, but no interaction between these two factors (p = .4). In the second analysis, a three-way ANOVA of the studied items only (with factors of group, repetition, and frequency) revealed main effects for group, F(\, 22) = 4.98, p < .05, and repetition, F(l, 22) = 5.24, p < .05, and a marginally significant effect for frequency, F(l, 22) = 3.83, p = .06, but no interaction between group and repetition (p > .5), indicating that AD patients were influenced to the same degree as normal subjects by the number of prior stimulus exposures. In all of these analyses, there was no interaction between prior exposure and word frequency (i.e., the magnitude of the priming effect did not differ for high-and lowfrequency words). Further, no Group x Prior Exposure x Frequency interaction occurred. However, inspection of the data clearly indicated the presence of an interaction between prior study and word frequency in the NCS group: The mean £ Figure 6 . Recognition performance in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and normal control subjects (NCS) for high-and lowfrequency words that appeared one or three times in a prior study list.
priming effect for low-frequency words was 12.36 ms and for high-frequency words was 5.02 ms. A two-way ANOVA of the NCS data alone revealed a significant Prior Exposure x Frequency interaction, F(2, 22) = 5.06,^ < .05. It appears then, thai the NCS, like the college students in Experiment 1 A, showed greater priming for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. In contrast, in AD patients, the magnitude of the priming effect was similar for high-and lowfrequency words (14.03 and 15.12, respectively).
Recognition
The mean d' scores in each of the four experimental conditions (denned by crossing repetition with word frequency) are shown in Figure 6 .
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA (with factors of group, repetition, and word frequency) revealed main effects for repetition, F(l, 22) = 35.91, p < .001. and word frequency, F(\, 22) = 34.50, p < .001, reflecting better recognition memory for words presented three times rather than once and for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. AD patients were significantly impaired overall compared with NCS, F(l, 22) = 23.54, p < .001, and did not show a normal effect of repetition, Repetition x Group interaction F(l, 22) = 12.06, p < .005. The word Frequency x Group interaction approached significance F(\, 22) = 3.76, p = .065, reflecting the failure of the AD group to show a normal recognition advantage for low-frequency words. Neither of the remaining interactions reached significance. In two separate analyses, we examined the effect of word frequency and group on the hit and false alarm rates. A twoway ANOVA of false alarm rates (with factors of group and word frequency) showed a higher rate of false alarms in the AD group, F(\, 22) = 10.11, p < .005, and a main effect for word frequency, F( 1,22)= I6.2,p < .OOl.indicatingahigher incidence of false alarms for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words. A Group x Frequency interaction that fell short of significance (p < . 10) suggested a disproportionately higher rate of false alarms to high-frequency words than to low-frequency words in the AD group. The analysis of hit rates showed no effect for group (p > .10) but did show an effect for frequency, F(l, 22) = 11.12, p < .005, reflecting better performance with low-frequency words than with highfrequency words, and a Group x Frequency interaction, F(l, 22) = 9.99, p < .005, reflecting the failure of the AD group to show a normal recognition advantage in hit rates for lowfrequency words. Wilson, Bacon, Kramer, Fox, and Kaszniak (1983) reported a similar pattern of hit-rate recognition performance in AD patients.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, prior study of words reduced the exposure time necessary for subsequent identification of those words; the priming effect was of a normal magnitude in AD patients despite impaired recognition memory performance. These results have three implications. First, they constitute evidence that priming in a perceptual-identification task is dissociable from recognition memory'-Second, they suggest that this kind of priming does not depend on limbic and cortical regions compromised in AD. Third, they suggest that impaired word-completion priming in AD is not due simply to the lexical nature of the priming stimuli. The results demonstrate, instead, that AD patients can show a normal magnitude of priming with words if the task invokes perceptual learning processes that are intact -in AD.
The results of the present experiment must be interpreted with caution, however, because the performance of AD patients differs from that of NCS in two respects. First, baseline performance (i.e., the exposure time necessary to identify unstudied words) was significantly impaired in AD patients compared with NCS: On average, AD patients required 107 ms of exposure to identify unstudied words, whereas NCS required 38 ms. Such a discrepancy in the baseline performance of the two groups complicates an interpretation of the priming effect in AD. AD patients have a variety of cognitive deficits (e.g., language, attention) that could contribute to inferior baseline performance on a perceptual-identification task. Our interpretation of the present results assumes that the effect of these deficits on the priming measure is additive rather than multiplicative (i.e., they add a constant amount to the exposure time necessary for AD patients to identify words, regardless of experimental condition). Under this assumption, the results of the present experiment suggest normal priming in AD.
However, a proportional measure of priming (i.e., priming calculated as a percentage of baseline performance) may be more appropriate than the absolute measure of priming used in the present study. For example, Snodgrass and colleagues (Snodgrass, 1989; Snodgrass, Corwin, & Feenan, 1988) have demonstrated in normal subjects and in patients that priming effects in a fragmented-picture identification task are proportional to baseline performance. Further, within the present study, there is evidence in normal subjects that priming effects in perceptual identification of words depend on base-line levels of performance: The NCS group in Experiment 2 required more exposure time to identify unstudied words than did the younger control subjects in Experiment 1A (37.5 ms vs. 24.4 ms) and showed a larger mean absolute priming effect than the younger subjects (8.7 ms vs. 4.1 ms). Although these data suggest that, across groups of normal subjects, the size of the perceptual priming effect varies directly with the level of baseline performance, they do not establish that such a relationship should be expected in a comparison across groups of normal and impaired subjects. It is possible that the mechanism underlying the higher baseline performance in the older subjects in relation to the younger control subjects is not the same as the mechanism underlying the higher baseline performance in the AD patients compared with agematched NCS. It could be, for example, that the mechanism underlying age-related decrements in baseline performance interacts with the priming effect but that the mechanism underlying dementia-related decrements in baseline performance does not. (This circumstance would not preclude the possibility that priming within a patient group could vary directly with baseline performance: In addition to the effects of dementia, patients would also be subject to the same effects that produce various levels of baseline performance in normal populations.) For this reason, the data from the younger and older control subjects in Experiments 1A and 2 do not address directly the measurement issue involved in the comparison of normal and impaired populations.
It remains an open question whether the normal magnitude of priming shown by AD patients in the present study represents fully intact perceptual priming. But in light of the apparent dependence of priming on baseline performance in normal subjects, we recalculated the priming score for the AD and NCS groups as a percentage of baseline performance. By this measure, the AD group showed less priming (mean priming effect = 11.5%) than did the NCS group (mean priming effect = 18.5%). A three-way ANOVA of these data, however, failed to show a significant effect of group on the priming scores (p > .2). In other words, the priming effect shown by the AD group did not differ significantly from that shown by the NCS group, even when a proportional measure of priming was used. Nevertheless, the difference between the two groups in baseline performance diminishes the certainty with which we can argue that the priming effect is normal in AD. A more convincing demonstration of normal priming would come from an experiment in which there was no baseline difference between groups. In Experiment 3, we were able to address this issue more directly.
The second aspect of performance that distinguishes the AD from the NCS group is the lack of an interaction between word frequency and prior exposure in the AD group. The NCS group, like the college students in Experiment 1A, showed a greater priming effect for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. In contrast, AD patients showed a similar magnitude of priming for high-and low-frequency words. One explanation of the interaction in the NCS group may be that they reached a ceiling in performance with the high-frequency words; that is, because less exposure time was required to identify high-frequency words than low-frequency words at baseline, there was less room for improvement (priming) in identifying high-frequency words. A performance ceiling might yield the observed larger priming effect for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words because low frequency words would have more room to be primed. By this account, the reason that AD patients showed equivalent priming for high-and low-frequency words was because they never reached a performance ceiling.
A ceiling effect interpretation could cast doubt on the claim that the performance of the AD group is normal; one could argue that it appears normal only because improvement in the NCS group was artificially limited by a performance ceiling. However, examination of the data argues against this interpretation. It is clear that the NCS group was not at a performance ceiling for low-frequency words (as evidenced by a significant effect of frequency, reflecting better performance with high-frequency words). If the priming effect in AD were normal due only to a ceiling effect in the NCS group, then priming for low-frequency words should have been impaired in the AD group. A separate two-way ANOVA for low-frequency words alone (with factors of group and prior exposure) indicated main effects for group, F(l, 22) = 4.42, p < .05, and prior exposure, F(2, 44) = 10.8 [,p < .001, but no interaction between these factors (p > .5). Thus, the magnitude of the priming effect was normal in the AD group in a condition in which there was no performance ceiling in the NCS group.
There is a second reason, however, to be concerned about the lack of an interaction between prior exposure and frequency in the AD group. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that the interaction may be modality specific: It was evident in Experiment 1A (in which stimuli were studied and tested in the same perceptual modality) but not in Experiment IB (in which stimuli were studied and tested in different perceptual modalities). In other words, the priming effect was greater for low-frequency words than for highfrequency words only when stimuli were studied and tested in the same perceptual modality. (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981 , reported a similar result. However, in that study, subjects failed to show any significant cross-modal priming, for highor low-frequency words. Thus, the absence of a priming advantage for low-frequency words under cross-modal conditions could have been due to a performance floor.) The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the locus of the low-frequency word priming advantage may be perceptual (rather than conceptual). The absence of this effect in the AD group weakens our claim that their performance represents intact perceptual priming.
However, studies that have examined in more detail the locus of the low-frequency word priming advantage have provided considerable evidence that the effect is not modality specific. For example, in four separate perceptual-identification experiments, Kirsner et al. (1983) found a significant interaction between prior exposure and word frequency (reflecting greater priming for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words) under cross-modal study-test conditions. In a further experiment, they demonstrated that there was no priming advantage for low-frequency words beyond that attributable to modality-free mechanisms (i.e., seeing a word did not add to the low-frequency word priming ad-vantage effected by hearing the word). These experiments provide strong evidence that an interaction between prior exposure and word frequency in perceptual identification reflects the contribution of nonperceptual (e.g., lexical or semantic) mechanisms. These results have two implications in the context of the present study: First, they suggest that the lack of a prior Exposure x Frequency interaction in the AD group was due to an impairment of nonperceptual mechanisms. Second, they suggest that the performance of the NCS group was mediated in part by nonperceptual mechanisms (because that group showed an interaction between prior exposure and frequency). These implications raise the possibility (discussed earlier) that normal priming in perceptual identification of words includes a nonperceptual component that is not expressed in the performance of AD patients. The contribution of this component, however, must be relatively small because its absence in the AD group did not significantly reduce the magnitude of their priming effect compared with the NCS group.
In summary, despite a range of cognitive deficits spanning memory, language, attention, and visuospatial abilities, AD patients showed a priming effect in perceptual identification of words equivalent in magnitude to that shown by NCS. Further, the priming effect in the two groups was similarly enhanced by stimulus repetition. Finally, when priming was expressed as a proportion of baseline performance (to correct for baseline differences between groups), priming in the AD and NCS groups was not significantly different. The one aspect of performance that distinguished the AD group from the NCS group was the failure of the AD group to show an interaction between prior exposure and word frequency. In light of the just-discussed evidence from Kirsner et al. (1983) , it is plausible that this interaction reflects the contribution of lexical or semantic (rather than perceptual) mechanisms to the priming effect; thus, its absence in the AD group does not necessarily imply a deficit in perceptual learning mechanisms.
The results of Experiment 2 provide evidence that neural circuits relatively intact in AD support perceptual learning mechanisms that underlie priming in perceptual identification of words. Coupled with prior reports of impaired wordcompletion priming, these results establish a dissociation in AD between two components of verbal priming. However, because intact perceptual priming and impaired word-completion priming have not been demonstrated within a single group of AD patients, it is possible that the dissociation reflects variability among patient groups rather than differences among task processes. In Experiment 3, we sought stronger evidence for the separability of perceptual and conceptual priming processes by administering the perceptual priming task and a word-completion priming task to a single group of AD patients.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method Subjects
We tested 10 patients with a diagnosis of probable AD and 10 age-matched healthy control subjects. AD patients. All AD patients had a diagnosis of probable AD based on NINCDS (McKhann et al., 1984) and NIA (Khachaturian, 1985) criteria. The group included 5 women and 5 men. The mean age was 70.5 years (range = 57-81), and the mean level of education was 13.6 years (range = 8-20). The mean BDS score (Blessed et al., 1968) was 18.7 (range = 3-36.5), indicating mild to severe dementia. No patient was institutionalized.
NCS.
The control group consisted of spouses or siblings of AD patients involved in research studies at the MIT Clinical Research Center and subjects recruited through newspaper advertisements. The group included 5 men and 5 women with a mean age of 68.2 years (range = 55-80) and a mean educational level of 12.7 years (range = 8-20). All subjects were examined by a neurologist and found to be free of dementia. There was no statistical difference between the AD and NCS groups in mean age or level of education.
Perceptual Identification: Materials and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure for the perceptual-identification and recognition tasks were identical to those described in Experiment 2.
Word Completion
Materials. We selected 92 words, 4-11 letters in length, of which half were high-frequency (with at least 85 occurrences per million, M = 214) and half were low-frequency (with no more than 10 occurrences per million. M = 2.9), according to the Kucera and Francis (1967) word frequency count. The stem (i.e., the first 3 letters) of each word was unique among the 92 words and constituted the beginning of at least 10 entries in the MerrUtm-Webster Dictionary (1974) . Each of the 92 words was not the most common completion given for its stem in a pilot study of 60 normal subjects. Twelve of the words were used as filler items. The remaining 80 words were divided into two lists that were used to create two distinct, balanced forms of the test. Each 40-word list included 20 high-frequency words and 20 low-frequency words. For each test form, half of the words were presented in an initial study phase and in a subsequent word-completion or recognition task (targets), and the other half were presented only in the word-completion or recognition task (foils). Of the words that appeared in the study phase, half were presented once, and the other half were presented three times. The target and foil word sets included equal numbers of high-and low-frequency words, as did the word sets presented once or three times in the study list. Across subjects, the stimuli were counterbalanced such that each word appeared equally often in the word-completion or recognition tasks and as a target or foil item.
Procedure. The procedure in the study phase was the same as that described in Experiments IA and 2. Twenty different words were presented singly on the computer screen; half were presented one time, and the other half were presented three times. In addition to these 40 trials, three filler words were presented at the beginning and end of the list to blunt any primacy and recency effects on memory for the stimuli. The study phase was followed immediately by a word-completion or recognition task. Each subject performed a word-completion task with one lest form and a recognition task with a second test form composed of different stimuli.
In the word-completion task, 40 three-letter word stems were presented one at a time on a computer screen; subjects were asked to complete each stem with the first word that came to mind. Twenty of the words had appeared in the prior study list; 10 had appeared once, and 10 had appeared three times. The other 20 words had not appeared in the study list.
The procedure in the yes-no recognition task was the same as that described in Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects studied a list of 20 words, of which 10 appeared once and 10 appeared three times. Three filler words appeared at the beginning and end of the list. Immediately after this list, 40 words were presented for recognition, of which half had appeared on the prior study list (one or three times) and half had not. (We administered a recognition measure with the wordcompletion task rather than referring to the recognition measure administered with the perceptual-identification task because the numbers of stimuli differed in the two priming tasks. By including a parallel recognition measure with each priming task, we could demonstrate that recognition memory in AD was impaired under both task conditions.) Nine of the 10 AD patients in this experiment also received a test of category fluency as pan of a separate cognitive screening battery. (They were given 1 min per category to generate as many exemplars as they could from the categories "four-footed animals" and "vegetables.") The verbal fluency impairment in AD has been well documented (Butters, Granholm, Salmon, Grant, & Wolf, 1987; Ober, Dronkers, Koss, Delis, & Friedland, 1986) and is thought to reflect either the degradation of information in semantic memory or a deficit in lexical access. We hypothesized that the mechanism underlying impaired verbal fluency in AD is related to the mechanism underlying impaired word-completion priming in AD but is unrelated to the mechanism supporting perceptual priming. On this basis, we predicted that performance in a category fluency task would be correlated with priming in a word-completion task but uncorrelated with priming in a perceptual-identification task. 
Results
Perceptual Identification
For each subject, we calculated the mean exposure time required to identify words in each of the experimental conditions denned by crossing number of prior exposures (none vs. one vs. three) with word frequency (Figure 7 ). All subjects in the NCS group and 9 of 10 subjects in the AD group showed a mean priming effect in the predicted direction.
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA (with factors of subject group, prior exposure, and word frequency) showed that AD patients required significantly more exposure time than NCS to identify words, group F(\, 18) = 5.76, p < .05, and that high-frequency words were identified at briefer exposure times than low-frequency words, F(\, 18) = 8.85, p < .01. The priming effect in perceptual identification was indicated by a main effect for prior exposure, F(2, 36) = 14,51, p < .001. As in Experiment 2, there was no Group x Prior Exposure interaction (p > A), indicating that the priming effect did not differ in magnitude in the AD and NCS groups. The interaction between prior exposure and word frequency approached significance, F(2, 36) = 2.90, p = .07, reflecting greater priming for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words in the one-exposure condition and greater priming for low-frequency words than for highfrequency words in the three-exposure condition. Neither of the other interactions reached significance. In contrast to the results of Experiment 2, analyses of the data from each subject group separately revealed no interaction between prior exposure and word frequency in the NCS group (p > .2) or in the AD group {p > .1).
The perceptual priming results in this experiment replicate those of Experiment 2 and indicate that AD patients showed a normal magnitude of priming in perceptual identification of words. However, an interpretation of this result is complicated by the fact that the AD group showed significantly worse performance at baseline than the NCS group (as was also the case in Experiment 2). To compare the priming performance of the two subject groups in the absence of baseline differences, we excluded the 4 AD patients who required the most exposure time to identify unstudied words. With the exclusion of these patients, the baseline performance of the two groups was similar (Figure 8 ). (We were unable to perform a similar analysis in Experiment 2 because there was not a subset of AD patients whose baseline performance approximated that of the NCS group.)
A three-way repeated measures ANOVA (with factors of group, prior exposure, and word frequency) revealed no effect for group (p > .2), a main effect for prior exposure, F(2, 28) = 35.41, p < .001, and no Group x Prior Exposure interaction (p > .5), indicating normal priming in the AD group. There was a main effect for word frequency, F( 1, 14)= 9.98, p < .01, reflecting greater exposure time to identify lowfrequency words than high-frequency words, and a Prior Exposure x Frequency interaction, F(2, 28) = 3.22, p = .055, reflecting greater priming for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words in the one-exposure condition and greater priming for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words in the three-exposure condition. Neither of the remaining interactions reached significance. These results indicate that when baseline performance was equated in the two groups, the priming effect in the AD group was normal.
Word Completion
We calculated for each subject the proportion of word stems completed to target words in each of the six experimental conditions defined by crossing number of prior ex- posures (none, one, or three) with word frequency. The proportion of stems completed to target words in the no-exposure condition provided a baseline measure of word-completion performance. The baseline scores in the AD group were 17.2% for high-frequency words and 5.0% for low-frequency words and in the NCS group were 10.0% for high-frequency words and 3.0% for low-frequency words. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA of the baseline scores (with factors of group and word frequency) indicated that the baseline performance of the AD and NCS groups did not differ (p > . 10), that there Figure 9 . Word-completion priming in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and normal control subjects (NCS). (Bars show mean priming scores for high-and low-frequency words after one or three prior exposures in a study list.) were more completions for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words, F(\, 18) = 14.03, p < .005, and that this frequency effect did not interact with group (p > .3). We calculated four priming scores for each subject by subtracting the proportion of target completions in the baseline conditions from the proportion of target completions in the primed conditions ( Figure 9 ).
All subjects in the NCS group and 6 of 10 subjects in the AD group showed a mean priming effect in the predicted direction. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA of the priming scores (with factors of group, repetition [one vs. three], and word frequency) revealed impaired priming in the AD group, F(l, 18) = 8.48, p < .01. The magnitude of the priming effect was not influenced by stimulus repetition (p > .10) or by word frequency (p > .50). However, an interaction between repetition and frequency, F(l, 18) = 15.76, p < .001, indicated a larger priming effect for highfrequency words than for low-frequency words in the one-exposure condition and a larger priming effect for lowfrequency words than for high-frequency words in the threeexposure condition. None of the three remaining interactions was significant. The lack of a repetition effect in this experiment differs from a report by Chen and Squire (1990) of a significant effect of repetition on word-completion priming. In the present experiment, the absence of a repetition effect could have been due to the performance of the AD group, who showed a mean priming effect of identical magnitude (12%) in the one-and three-exposure conditions. Although the NCS group did show a larger mean priming effect for words in the three-exposure condition (36%) than for those in the one-exposure condition (23%), this effect failed to reach significance in an analysis of the NCS data alone (p < .10). The discrepancy between the results of the two studies may be due to the different repetition conditions used (one or three exposures in the present study vs. one, two, or four exposures in Chen & Squire) .
The just-described analysis revealed that word-completion priming in the AD group was significantly less than that in the NCS group. To determine whether priming in the AD group was greater than chance, we performed a / test on the difference between completion rates for primed and unprimed word stems. This difference was significant, /(9) = 2.76, p < .05, indicating that priming was present (although reduced) in the AD group.
In the category fluency task, 9 AD patients generated an average of 6.6 exemplars per category (range = 2-14.5). Performance in the category fluency task was correlated with priming in the word-completion task (r = .76, p < .05) but uncorrelated with priming in the perceptual-identification task(r = -.11).
Recognition
For both recognition memory measures, we calculated the mean d' scores in each of the four experimental conditions defined by crossing repetition with word frequency ( Figures  10 and 11) .
For the 64-trial recognition measure, a three-way repeated measures ANOVA (with factors of group, repetition, and word frequency) revealed impaired performance by the AD group, F(\, 18) = 11.77, p < .005, and main effects for repetition, F(\, 18)= 100.18, p < .001, and word frequency, F(l, 18) = 31.20, p < .001, reflecting better memory for repeated words than for nonrepeated words and better memory for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. AD patients failed to show a normal effect of repetition, Repetition x Group interactional, 18)= 12.32, p < .005. None of the remaining interactions approached significance. In two separate analyses, we examined the hit and false alarm Figure 11 . Recognition performance (40-item test) in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and normal control subjects (NCS) for high-and low-frequency words that appeared one or three times in a prior study list. Figure 10 . Recognition performance (64-item test) in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and normal control subjects (NCS) for high-and low-frequency words that appeared one or three times in a prior study list.
rates for high-and low-frequency words. A two-way ANOVA of false alarm rates (with factors of group and word frequency) revealed impaired performance (i.e., a higher rate of false alarms) in the AD group, F(\, 18) = 10.30, p < .005, a higher rate of false alarms for high-frequency words than for lowfrequency words, F(\, 18)= 13.23, p< .005, and no Group x Frequency interaction (p > .3). A two-way ANOVA of hit rates showed no effect for group (p > . 5) and a main effect for word frequency, F(l, 18) = 7.30,p < .05, indicating more hits for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. Unlike the analysis of hit rates in Experiment 2, this analysis revealed no Group x Frequency interaction (p > .5), indicating that the advantage for low-frequency words was similar in the two groups.
In the 40-trial recognition memory measure, AD patients showed impaired performance. A three-way ANOVA of d' scores showed main effects for group, F(l, 18) = 6.77, p < .05, repetition, F(\, 18) = 31.64, p < .001, and word frequency, F(l, 18) = 33.77,;? < .001. In this measure, unlike the 64-trial measure, there was no interaction between group and repetition, indicating that the advantage in recognition memory for repeated words was similar in the two groups. None of the remaining interactions was significant. A twoway ANOVA of false alarm rates (with factors of group and word frequency) showed a higher rate of false alarms in the AD group, F(\, 18) = 9.29, p < .01, and a higher rate of false alarms for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words, F(l, 18) = 17.59, p < .001. An interaction between group and word frequency, F(l, 18) = 5.43,£>< .05, indicated that the AD group showed a disporportionately higher rate of false alarms for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words. A two-way ANOVA of hit rates showed no effect for group (p > .4) and a main effect for word frequency, F(l, 18) = 10.36, p < .005, indicating a higher rate of hits for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words. The interaction between group and word frequency failed to reach significance (p > .10).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, AD patients showed impaired recognition memory performance, a normal magnitude of priming in perceptual identification of words, and an impaired magnitude of priming in word completion. Further, in the AD group, word-completion priming was correlated with category fluency performance, but perceptual-identification priming was not. The significance of these results is fourfold. First, they replicate the finding of an intact magnitude of perceptual priming in AD in Experiment 2; second, they replicate four prior reports of impaired word-completion priming in AD (Gabrieli, 1986; Heindcl ct al., 1989; Salmon etal., 1988; Shimamuraetal., 1987) ; third, they demonstrate for the first time a within-subjects dissociation in AD between priming in perceptual identification of words and priming in a word-completion task; and fourth, they provide corroborative evidence (from the verbal fluency measure) of the dissociability of the mechanisms supporting priming in word completion and perceptual identification.
The results of Experiment 3 also gave us the opportunity to readdrcss two issues that complicated our interpretation of the performance of AD patients in Experiment 2. First, in Experiment 3, as in Experiment 2, the baseline performance of the AD group was worse than that of the NCS group (98 ms vs. 46 ms to identify unstudied words). Although the priming effect in the AD group was of a normal absolute magnitude, it was of a reduced magnitude when expressed as a percentage of baseline performance (18.3% priming in the AD group vs. 27.5% in the NCS group). Further (and in a contrast to Experiment 2), the difference between groups in the present experiment approached significance (p = .07) when priming was measured proportionally rather than absolutely. Because it is unclear which measure (absolute or proportional) provides an appropriate index of priming across normal and impaired populations, an unambiguous comparison between groups requires that they exhibit similar levels of baseline performance. In Experiment 3, we were able to perform such a comparison between the NCS group and a subset of the AD group whose baseline performance was normal. As mentioned earlier, this analysis indicated normal perceptual priming in the AD group. This subsidiary analysis lends support to the claim that the normal magnitude of priming exhibited by the AD groups in Experiments 2 and 3 reflects intact perceptual priming.
The second issue that complicated an interpretation of the data in Experiment 2 was the presence of a Prior Exposure x Frequency interaction (reflecting greater priming for lowfrequency words than for high-frequency words) in the NCS group and its absence in the AD group. In Experiment 3, this interaction was not evident in the global analysis, nor was it evident in separate analyses of the NCS and AD data alone. Instead, in both groups, the mean priming effect for high-and low-frequency words was similar. Thus, the interaction between word frequency and priming is not reliable across healthy elderly control subjects (it was present in the NCS group in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 3). Its absence in the AD groups in Experiments 2 and 3 may not reflect an impairment specific to AD.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to determine whether priming in perceptual identification of briefly presented words was normal in AD patients and dissociable from priming in a word-completion task. In Experiment 1, to establish the reliability of our priming measure, we administered the task to a large group of normal subjects. Consistent with other studies, prior exposure to a word enhanced subsequent perceptual identification of that word; this priming effect was greater for low-frequency words than for high-frequency words (when words were studied and tested in the same modality), and the magnitude of the priming effect was reduced when the perceptual modality of presentation differed at study and identification. In Experiment 2, AD patients showed a normal magnitude of priming during perceptual identification of briefly presented words. In Experiment 3, we replicated this result and demonstrated a dissociation between perceptual priming and word-completion priming within a single group of AD patients. These results suggest the neural separability of two components of verbal priming: a perceptual component (intact in AD) and a conceptual component (impaired in AD).
Perceptual priming was dissociated from recognition memory' in the present study in two ways. In Experiment IB, a shift in perceptual modality between study and test reduced the magnitude of the priming effect but did not significantly affect recognition memory. In Experiments 2 and 3, AD patients showed a normal magnitude of perceptual priming but impaired recognition memory. These results replicate similar dissociations between perceptual priming and recall or recognition memory in normal subjects (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) and in patients with global amnesia (Cermak et al., 1985) . More generally, the dissociation between recognition memory and priming is consistent with theories that posit a distinction between one form of memory that depends on limbic-diencephalic function and another form that does not (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975) . The present study extends previous work, however, by demonstrating that perceptual priming may not depend on the cortical and subcortical structures outside the limbic-diencephalic region that are typically damaged in AD.
Three aspects of the present results provide evidence for the dissociability of perceptual priming and word-completion priming: First, AD patients showed normal perceptual priming by an absolute measure but impaired word-completion priming by either an absolute or a proportional measure. Second, across Experiments 2 and 3, the percentage of AD patients who showed perceptual priming was 86% (vs. 91% in the NCS group), and the percentage who showed word-completion priming was 60% (vs. 100% in the NCS group). Third, the performance of the AD patients on a category fluency task was correlated with word-completion priming but uncorrelated with perceptual priming. These results provide strong evidence that perceptual-identification and word-completion priming tasks index separate learning mechanisms that are differentially susceptible to the effects of AD.
Two prior studies reported intact repetition-priming effects in AD on a lexical-decision task (Moscovitch, 1982; Ober & Shenaut, 1988) , in which the measure of priming was the reduction in response time from the first to the second presentation of a word. There is evidence that this priming effect may, under some conditions, include a substantial perceptual component: The effect can be attenuated or eliminated if the first occurrence of a word is presented in a different perceptual modality or in a different visual code (e.g., pictorial) than the second (Kirsner & Smith, 1974; Monsell, 1985; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979) . The preservation of lexical-decision repetition-priming effects in AD may reflect the operation of those mechanisms that support normal perceptual priming in the present study. Moscovitch, Winocur, and McLachlan (1986) found that a group of memory-disordered patients (including AD patients) showed normal repetition effects on speed of reading geometrically transformed script and on speed of reading sentences and word pairs with and without contextual manipulation. Because the subject population in the Moscovitch et al. study included patients with etiologies other than AD, their results may not be directly comparable to our own. However, their results are consistent with the present study in that they suggest intact priming in AD on two priming tasks that may draw largely on perceptual learning mecha-
Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Dissociable Priming Effects: Evidence From Normal Cognition
There is convergent evidence in normal cognition that priming is not the product of a unitary mechanism. For example, Witherspoon and Moscovilch (1989) reported stochastic independence between priming in perceptual identification of words and priming in word-fragment completion. Further, in a series of studies, Roediger, Blaxton, and colleagues (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989 ) demonstrated the dissociability of measures of memory that require an analysis of the physical features of stimuli (data-driven tasks) and measures that require an analysis of the meanings of stimuli (conceptdriven tasks). The dissociation between data-driven and concept-driven processes in normal cognition parallels the dissociation between perceptual and conceptual priming in AD.
Evidence that priming in perceptual identification of words is primarily perceptual (rather than conceptual) comes from findings that this kind of priming in normal subjects depends critically on a perceptual match between the study and test presentations of a word. Priming in perceptual identification of visually presented words is reduced or eliminated when the surface characteristics (e.g., case, font) differ at study and test (Jacoby & Hayman, 1987) , when the words are presented in pictorial form at study (Winnick & Daniel, 1970) , when words are generated rather than read at study (Clarke & Morton, 1983, Experiment 1; Jacoby, 1983b; Winnick & Daniel, 1970) , and when the words are presented auditorily at study (Experiment IB; Clarke & Morton, 1983 , Experiments 2 and 3; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, Experiment 6; Kirsner et al., 1983) . Thus, priming in perceptual identification of words does not result merely from prior activation of the abstract representation of a word but depends on repeated processing of modality-specific perceptual features of the stimulus.
Modality specificity, however, is not restricted to priming tasks that involve perceptual identification. Indeed, priming effects in a variety of tasks, including word-stem completion (Bassili, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989; Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985) , context-dependent word-stem completion (Schacter & Graf, 1989) , and word-fragment completion (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a) , are attenuated when the modality of exposure differs in the study and test phases. The ubiquitousness of modality effects across priming tasks suggests that all instances of priming depend to some extent on perceptual learning processes.
There are three sources of evidence in normal cognition, however, that priming in a word-completion task includes a component beyond the perceptual one that it shares with priming in a perceptual-identification task. First, priming in the two tasks is differentially sensitive to shifts in study-test modality. Priming in word completion has been reduced, but never eliminated, cross-modally (Bassili et al., 1989; . In contrast, priming in perceptual identification of words has been statistically eliminated cross-modally in at least two studies (Clarke & Morton, 1983 , Experiments 2 and 3; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) . Second, priming in the two tasks is dissimilarly influenced by depth-of-processing manipulations. Word-completion priming is sometimes enhanced by elaborative encoding: Two studies demonstrated significantly greater priming after semantic encoding compared with nonsemantic encoding of words (Chiarello & Hoyer, 1988; , and one other study reported a similar (nonsignificant) trend . On the other hand, priming in perceptual identification of words is not enhanced by elaborative encoding: In one study, the depth-of-processing manipulation had virtually no effect (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) and in another, the manipulation produced a nonsignificant trend toward greater priming in the nonsemantic encoding condition (Kirsner et al., 1983, Experiment 1) . Third, the duration of priming in the two tasks differs: Word-completion priming disappears after 2 hr even with as many as 32 exposures to stimuli in a study list (Chen & Squire, 1990) .
1 In contrast, priming in perceptual identification of words can persist for 24 hr (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) or for several days (Jacoby, 1983a) after one or two exposures in a study list. These three lines of evidence demonstrate the dissociability of word-completion priming and perceptual priming in normal cognition and suggest that the two tasks do not index a single cognitive mechanism.
2 Note, however, that longer lasting word-completion priming effects have been obtained in normal subjects when word stems specified unique solutions (Squire, Shimamura, & Graf, 1987, Experiment 2) . However, in that experiment, amnesic subjects failed to show normal priming; Squire et al. suggested that the long-lasting effect in normal subjects might have been mediated by conscious retrieval strategies.
In summary, we propose that all priming tasks depend on perceptual learning processes but differ in the degree to which they depend on those processes and in the extent to which they draw additionally on conceptual learning processes. On tasks in which subjects are provided with incomplete or degraded perceptual information (e.g., identification of briefly presented words or incomplete pictures), priming may reflect, in larger part, perceptual learning processes (and so might be eliminated under cross-modal conditions). On tasks requiring a search for a word satisfying a particular orthographic or semantic constraint (e.g., word completion, category exemplar production), priming may reflect a larger contribution of conceptual learning processes in relation to perceptual learning processes (and so would not be eliminated under cross-modal conditions). The findings to date suggest that neural circuits spared in AD support perceptual learning processes but fail to support conceptual learning processes.
Neural Basis of Dissociable Priming Effects
Gabrieli and colleagues (Gabrieli, 1989, in press; Gabrieli et al., 1990 ) postulated that a structural-perceptual memory system, localized to the occipital lobe, supports perceptual priming effects and that a lexical-semantic memory system, localized to temporoparietal cortex, supports conceptual priming effects. The dissociation in AD between perceptual priming and word-completion priming lends support to this hypothesis. The neuropathology in AD is not diffuse and complete but exhibits regional variability, with pronounced involvement of neocortical association areas in the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes (Brun & Englund, 1981; Pearson et al., 1985; Rogers & Morrison, 1985; Terry el al., 1981; Wilcock & Esiri, 1982) , and relative sparing of primary sensory cortices (Brun & Englund, 1981; Esiri, Pearson, & Powell, 1986; Lewis, Campbell, Terry, & Morrison, 1987; Rogers & Morrison, 1985) . Results of in vivo physiological studies reveal that metabolic activity is significantly reduced in temporoparietal cortex but is relatively normal in occipital cortex in AD patients (Johnson, Mueller, Walshe, English, & Hoiman, 1987) . Further, a demonstration of an intact visual aftereffect in AD patients (Savoy & Gabrieli, 1990) provides evidence for normal plasticity in an occipital circuit. The reduction of temporoparietal lobe function and the relative preservation of occipital lobe function in AD, coupled with the results of the present study, suggest that perceptual priming may depend largely on the integrity of occipital cortex and that word-completion priming may depend largely on the integrity of more anterior cortical regions compromised in AD.
Convergent (albeit indirect) evidence about the neural localization of priming in perceptual identification of words comes from the work of Raichle and colleagues (Peterscn, Fox, Snyder, & Raichle, 1990; Posner, Pctersen, Fox, & Raichle, 1988) , who examined cerebral blood flow in normal subjects during word perception. They found that the brain activation attributable to coding of the visual word form was confined to the occipital lobe (in particular, to an area of extrastriate cortex). Thus, in normal cognition, an occipital circuit supports perceptual processes that enable one to identify word form. We propose that priming in perceptual identification of words reflects the enhancement of those processes and is similarly localizable to the occipital lobe.
Our account of the present results shares many features with a theory of priming put forward by Schacter and Tulving (Schacler, in press; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . They postulate that priming is mediated by a perceptual representation system that processes structural descriptions of objects and operates at a presemantic level. Thus, both their account and our own emphasize the critical role of perceptual learning processes in priming. Our account differs from Schacter and Tulving's in that it stresses, additionally, the interaction of conceptual (i.e., lexical-semantic) processes with those perceptual processes in a variety of priming tasks. The results of the present study demonstrate a dissociation between perceptual and conceptual priming in AD and may elucidate the neural basis of dissociable priming effects in normal cognition.
